A New US-China balance, up for negotiation

THE CHINA CHOICE: Why America should Share Power,
by Hugh White,
Black Inc.,190pp.

Reviewed: 11 August 2012

Hugh White is ANU Professor of Strategic Studies and one of the heavyweights of Australian strategic policy discussion, but this book barely touches on strategic decisions for Australia. Instead, The China Choice discusses how the United States should respond to the inexorable growth of China’s economic and strategic power. The choices that White identifies are to be made in Washington, with the implication that Australia will be swept along with whatever course the USA adopts.

That’s not a matter for complacency. White sees that both China and the United States are capable of mishandling their strategic relationship to the point that war on a damaging scale is a dangerous possibility. Australia would incur collateral damage.

Both nations have unusually strong cultures that see themselves as the natural centre of the world. In China’s case, this is expressed mainly in demand for respect and recognition. In America’s case, this extends to belief in a destiny to re-shape the world in America’s image. In both cases, the domestic political system makes it difficult for a leader to advocate compromise without being attacked as a traitor.

The key word in White’s analysis is “primacy”, which I take to mean unchallengeable military superiority. He warns that America and its allies tend to overestimate America’s current military superiority. As White describes it, America’s vast abilities to project military force across the globe are unlikely to be challenged in the near future, but this form of power does not clearly translate into the ability to control political and economic events.

America may be able to prevent China from achieving “primacy” beyond its immediate neighbourhood, but White doubts that America, even now, has the real power to prevent a determined Chinese takeover of Taiwan. China’s capabilities already make the cost of defending Taiwan would be too high for America. For example, China’s ability to sink American aircraft carriers with land-based missiles could not be neutralized without escalating attacks upon Chinese mainland facilities, with likely retaliation that could reach nuclear level. Few if any American allies would support such a venture. .

On the other hand, China’s ability to assert power beyond its borders is also limited, not by Western encirclement, but by the several major regional powers that have historical reasons to be suspicious of Chinese power – Japan, Korea, Vietnam, India, Indonesia and others. White recognizes the tremendous growth of Chinese “soft power” globally through trade, investment, and careful cultivation of local elites. This has brought China greatly enhanced political influence in multilateral structures such as the United Nations.

It could be argued that White under-estimates the depth of anxiety among China’s neighbours over growing Chinese power. For neighbouring nations, many of which already host significant Chinese racial minorities, the issues are not just about whose ships are in the harbour. They have historical reasons to fear economic colonization, and increasing long-term immigration from China, that might accelerate under Chinese hegemony. A remote, over-fed hegemon (such as America) is always preferable to a neighbouring, hungry hegemon, because they are less likely to move permanently into your house.

White projects growth in Chinese strategic power as a close parallel to its economic growth – in fact he asserts that the two can generally be assumed to match. He disagrees with those who claim China’s economy has too many underlying weaknesses to support the kind of power that could challenge American primacy. But he does believe that China’s ability to devote resources to military competition is constrained by the need for the Communist Party regime to maintain popularity at home through economic growth. Well, maybe. That hasn’t bothered North Korea, nor other revanchist powers throughout history.

The rivalry between US and China is focussed in the Western Pacific, where China would like to establish primacy and America wants to keep it. White contends that neither side can win such a competition, but much harm can be done in such contest to all countries of the region. He proposes that America and China must learn, somehow, to share power and leadership, at least within that region.

At this point, White looks to the model under which Europe, following the disastrous Napoleonic period, avoided major conflict between competing powers for most of the Nineteenth Century,. There was a formal agreement, the Concert of Europe, among all the major regional powers to oppose any of their number from seeking primacy. It seems an extraordinarily tall order for the Asia-Pacific in this century to follow that model.

White acknowledges that such an accord – a “Concert of Asia” – would require major concessions from America, China, Japan, India, and other major regional powers to accept limits on their national ambitions. The objectives are sound, possibly even essential, but I find it hard to imagine the Asian powers accepting it, even if America could offer it. Asian cultures tend to avoid binding commitments in favour of relationships of ambiguity and perpetual negotiation. What is written is not necessarily the last word.

Any proposals for strategic dialogue with China should be read in the context of Sun Tzu’s Art of War, whose precepts on tactics, negotiation, strategy and psychology still shape Chinese strategic thinking. They are supremely pragmatic, whereas White argues for adoption of common principles for common benefit – a more Western and legalistic concept.

In truth this book is really directed to the Americans, who have the ball firmly in their court. China’s powers and demands for recognition will not stop growing, and it is for America to decide how to respond. White reduces the options to three choices for America: to concede the Western Pacific to Chinese primacy (undesirable), to continue to assert American primacy over China (unsustainable), or to negotiate sharing of power.

President Obama fired a shot across China’s bows in his speech to the Australian Parliament earlier this year, and more gestures and assertions may follow during this election year at least. But Henry Kissinger has written recently, in the journal Foreign Affairs and in his book On China, along similar lines to White. He also asserts that America must find a way to share power with China, but I don’t think Kissinger went so far as to say America and China could make a formal agreement about it, with all the neighbours as witnesses. It’s one thing to quietly concede a degree of imperial hauteur, but quite another to announce that you are doing it.

A basic rule of negotiation is that you do not give away your final position at the beginning. White goes so far as to offer, as his final chapter, a proposed text for an Address to the Nation by an unnamed American President, setting out the reasons why the United States has decided to share power with China in the Western Pacific. Australian readers may appreciate the cheekiness more than some Americans.

Despite Hugh White’s history as advisor to Australian governments, there is no suggestion that Australian governments might have any significant say in how America’s China choice works out for our part of the world. But if this challenging book persuades significant Americans and their international friends that American primacy is up for negotiation, whether they like it or not, then I suspect Hugh White will have achieved his aim.

Richard Thwaites is a former foreign correspondent in China and later participed in Asia-Pacific negotiations for the Australian government.